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Abstract
The aggregate output volatility of US economy has declined sig-
nicantly since the early 1980s, while publicly-traded rmssales and
employment have become more volatile during the same period. The
latter fact contradicts many explanations of the Great Moderation
that imply a direct transfer between macro and rm-level volatilities.
In this paper, I argue that rms organization capital investment is
a key factor causing the macro and micro level volatility divergence.
Firm-specic intangible capital accumulation is an important source of
idiosyncratic risks, but it also makes a rm less susceptible to general
market risks. When organization capital becomes increasingly impor-
tant in the production process, the impact of rm-specic risk factor
rises, while that of general risk factor declines. The former raises rm-
level volatility; the latter reduces aggregate volatility, mainly through
weakening the positive co-movements among rms. In this sense, the
decline in macro volatility during the past two decades is rather a story
of the Great Dissolution.
My empirical analysis found that, consistent with the papers hy-
potheses, rm-level volatility increases with organizational investment,
but general factorsimpact on rm performance and a rms correla-
tion with others decrease with organizational investment. Simulations
of the general equilibrium model featuring organization capital invest-
ment are capable of replicating the volatility trends at both aggregate
and rm level for the past two decades.
Keywords: Organization Capital; Intangible Capital; Great Mod-
eration; Business Cycle; Firm Volatility; Investment.
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1 Introduction
The aggregate volatility of economic activities in major developed economies
has drastically declined over the past two decades. The phenomenon, dubbed
as the Great Moderation, is well-documented (McConnell & Perez-Quiros
(2000), Blanchard & Simon (2001), Stock & Watson (2002)), and has drawn
considerable attention from macroeconomists and policy makers. Previous
studies o¤er various explanations to the decline in aggregate uctuation.
The most straightforward answer is probably the good luck theory; i.e.,
smaller volatility is caused by smaller exogenous shocks (Stock & Watson,
2002). Other common suspects include improved monetary policy (Clarida
et al., 2000), nancial innovation and globalization, (Dynan et al., 2006),
and better supply-chain management and inventory control (Kahn et al.,
2002).
However, recent empirical studies indicate, contrary to the aggregate
trend, sales and employment at the rm level has become more volatile.
Comin & Mulani (2006), Comin & Philippon (2005) showed that the volatil-
ities of sales and employment growth for publicly-traded US rms have been
increasing in the past 50 years, and the pattern is fairly robust when sample
composition change and other exogenous factors are taken into account.1
Similar upward trend hold for turnover rate of industry leaders and rms
credit default risk. Related studies in nance literature (Pastor & Verson-
esi (2002), Wei & Zhang (2006), Campbell et al (2001)) have demonstrated
strong upward trend in rm stock returns. Outside of US, Thesmar &
Thoenig (2004) reported rising sales volatility for French rms. Buch, Dopke
& Stahn (2008) showed increasing idiosyncratic rm volatility in Germany.
Figure 1 displayed both aggregate and rm level sales volatilities over
the past 5 decades, represented by the rolling standard deviation of growth
rate in 9-year windows.2 In most business cycle models with only aggregate
uncertainties, there is basically no di¤erentiation between macro and micro
level volatility. Why this is not what we see in real data is an interesting
1Davis et al. (2006) showed that rising rm volatility is only present in publicly-traded
rms, and hypothesized that it might be due to more risky young rms going public in
recent years. But Comin (2008) demonstrated that the upward trend in rm volatility is
robust after controlling for age and cohort e¤ects. Thus the phenomenon is not a simple
matter of sample selection.
2The formula to calculate the rolling standard deviation of variableis growth rate is:
i;t =
vuut t+4X
=t 4
(gi;t   gt)2, wheregtis the average growth rate between t-4 and t+4. Firm-
level volatility at time t is the average standard deviation across all rms:1=n
Pn
i=1 i;t:
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question. As an extreme example, consider the case when all rms in the
economy are identical. Then macro and rm-level volatilities would be ex-
actly the same. Even when this unrealistic assumption is abandoned, the
reason why the two volatilities are heading opposite directions is still not
obvious. To study this volatility divergence is the major focus of the paper.
The phenomenon poses challenges to many existing explanations of declining
aggregate volatility which assume, directly or implicitly, that the economic
environment has become more "tranquil" since the great moderation.
Besides its intellectual appeal, the volatility divergence question is also
an important one. From a welfare evaluation point of view, it is relevant to
ask what the macro volatility decline actually means to individual agents.
Does it imply decreased economic uncertainty for households and rms, as
people often intuitively assume, or something else?3 A study of the question
can shed lights on such issues as the evolution of risk factors a¤ecting individ-
ual rms, how di¤erent rms respond di¤erently to macro-level shocks, and
the relevance and limitation of aggregate data in representing business cycle
dynamics. All these questions are of central concern to industrial/macro
economists and policy makers. Moreover, any trend shifts in business cy-
cle patterns are most likely related to certain fundamental changes in the
economic system. Hence, an investigation into the origin of volatility diver-
gence can also serve to deepen our understanding about ongoing structural
transformations in the economy.
Though there can be various important causes at work behind the volatil-
ity divergence, this paper captures one specic cause the rise of organi-
zation capital (OC) in the business sector. The main hypothesis is the
following. As a production factor, organization capital, or rm-specic in-
tangible capital, has become increasingly important over the past decades.
Investment in OC involves subjective decision making, trial-and-errors, and
unexpected successes and failures for a rm. In other words, it induces
rm-specic risks that do not equally a¤ect other rms. But at the same
time, accumulation of organization capital protect the rm from general,
market-wide risks. As a result of increasing investment in organization cap-
ital, rm-level volatility rises, while aggregate volatility declines, mainly due
to lowered positive co-movement among rms. In this sense, the observed
volatility decrease at the aggregate level should rather be called the Great
Dissolution.
3There is another intruguing phenomenon intimately related to the one investigated
here: several studies, using household-level data, show that consumption and income
volatilities of individual households have actually gone up in the Great Moderation period.
See, for example, Dynan et al. (2006), Davis & kahn (2008).
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Figure 1: Diverging macro and rm level sales volatilities
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The paper is organized in the following way. Section 2 decomposes the
aggregate and rm level volatilities, explains in detail the hypotheses that
link the rise of OC and the trends of output volatilities, and reviews related
literature. Section 3 species the empirical strategies to test the hypotheses
and presents the results. Section 4 establishes the stochastic general equi-
librium model involving OC investment. Section 5 simulates the model and
compares the model characteristics with empirical data. Section 6 discusses
the sensitivity of simulations. Section 7 adds adjustment cost to the basic
model to improve the models performance in imitating aggregate invest-
ment properties. Section 8 concludes.
2 Volatility Trends and the Role of Organization
Capital
2.1 Decomposing Volatilities
To see how macro and micro level uctuations can be trending di¤erently
from each other, its helpful to break volatilities down into di¤erent compo-
nents. Suppose there are n rms in the economy. Write rm is growth rate
gi;tas a linear function of two kinds of shocks: macroeconomic shock mt and
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rm-specic shock fi;t, with 2m and 
2
fbeing respective variance of shocks:
gi;t = s
m
i;tmt + s
f
i;tfi;t; i = 1; 2; :::n:
Therefore, the variance of rm is growth rate is 
smi;t
2
2m +

sfi;t
2
2f ;
and the average rm volatility takes the following form:
Weighted Average
F irm V olatility =
Pn
i=1wi

smi;t
2
2m +
Pn
i=1wi

sfi;t
2
2f ; (1)
where
Pn
i=1wi = 1:
The aggregate growth rate of the economy gt is the weighted average of
all rms: gt =
Pn
i=1wi;tgi;t: Thus the aggregate volatility can be written as
Aggregate V olatility =
nX
i=1
(wi)
2  smi;t2 2m + nX
i=1
(wi)
2

sfi;t
2
2f
+
nX
i=1
X
j 6=i
wiwjs
m
i;ts
m
j;t
2
m: (2)
Throughout the paper, I assume that the structure of exogenous shocks
do not change; i.e., 2m and 
2
f remain constant. Its easy to see that the
only way to allow the values of (1) and (2) to shift in di¤erent directions
is to change the relative importance of the two shocks, smi;t and s
f
i;t. More
specically, if the impact of macro shock smi;t decreases, while that of rm-
specic, idiosyncratic shock sfi;t increases, it is possible to have rm-level
volatility rising and aggregate volatility declining at the same time, while
the variances of shocks remain unchanged. In this scenario, the decline in
aggregate volatility would be mainly due to a decrease in the covariance
term, which is normally much bigger than the two variance terms, given a
large number of rms. In other words, the aggregate volatility decreases as
a result of reduced positive co-movements among rms.
Therefore, to understand the volatility divergence, it is crucial to nd
out what factor(s) are a¤ecting the change in relative impact of di¤erent
shocks. My main hypothesis is: increasing investment in organization cap-
ital, or rm-specic intangible capital, is the source of elevated impact of
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rm-specic risks, which leads to an increase rm-level volatility; at the
same time, organization capital decreases the inuence of general risk factor,
which results in reduced correlation among rms and decreasing aggregate
volatility.
2.1.1 Organization Capital in the Modern Economy
Prescott & Visscher (1980) denes organization capital as rm-specic in-
formation and knowledge. Jovanovic & Rousseau (2001) uses the phrase
whatever makes a group of people and assets more productive together
than apart. Lev (2001) describes it as the knowledge used to combine
human skills and physical capital into systems for producing and delivering
want-satisfying products. Though worded di¤erently, there are a couple
common elements in these denitions. First, organization capitals are rm-
specic resources. Two, they are mostly intangible assets. Thus, I use
organization capital and rm-specic intangible capital interchangeably in
this paper. Examples of organization capital abound, such as a rms brand
equity, customer network, R&D resources, management expertise, business
processes and other intangible production resources that live beyond one
period.
Faced with ever increasing speed of technological change and intensied
market competition, a modern rm can no longer rely on the physical assets
it possesses for a unique competitive advantage. Indeed, a major di¤erence
between industrial-age production and the so-called knowledge economy is
that the state-of-art intangible know-hows is no longer embodied in mega-
size machines, but carried by workers and organizations. Firms have to
distinguish themselves from the peers by developing optimal allocation of
decision rights, organization-specic human capital, e¢ cient incentive mech-
anism, capacity to cope with disruptive technological changes, and extensive
customer/supplier network. These softassets have become crucial di¤er-
entiating factors for modern businesses.4
Furthermore, the advancement of IT technology drastically changed the
cost of information processing and communication, which often requires
complementary investment in organizational structure and management processes.
Bresnahan, Brynjolfsson & Hitt (2002) found that greater level of IT invest-
ment is associated with increasing organizational redesign. They also found
that on average, every $1 of corporate investment in IT is correlated with
4There is abundant literature in management and business economics on the impor-
tance of di¤erent intangible asset classes. See, for example, Karl Erik (1997), Blair (2001),
Teece, Pisano & Shuen (1997).
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$10 increase in rms market value, suggesting complementary organiza-
tional investment of about $9, far exceeding the investment in technology
itself. At the same time, thanks to the IT revolution and other technological
innovations that boost e¢ ciency in direct production processes, more work-
ing hours are allocated to building intangible capitalscreating new ideas,
products, establishing new categories, managing di¤erent resources,etc., so
as to give the world something it didnt know it was missing.
Organization capital is highly rm-specic. The value of a brand, for
example, may depend on patent rights to the underlining technology, and
expenditures on advertising and other reputational investments. The value
of these assets largely depends on the functioning of the organization be-
hind them, thus making them very di¢ cult to trade on an outside market.
Changes in rms organization capital are by no means riskless. It involves
innovation, trial-and-error, and very likely, unexpected success and failure.
Same amount of investment expenditure may bring about very di¤erent re-
sults. Studies have found di¤erent e¤ects for various companiesadvertising
expenses in a same industry (Schmalensee, 1972). Empirical researches also
suggest high failure rates of business process redesign (e.g., Sauer & Yet-
ton, 1997), and IT related organizational change projects (Kemerer & Sosa,
1991), just like new investment in other technological innovations which in-
volve a high level of uncertainty. Therefore, when the production process
requires more organization capital, individual rmsvolatilities are likely to
rise.
At the same time, organization capital investment can change the risk
prole that a rm is faced with. On one hand, the risk incurred in OC in-
vestment is largely rm-specic, or idiosyncratic, in nature. This is because,
rst, the high cost incurred in copying other rms organizational practice
may prevent a quick spread of any new OC innovation across rms; sec-
ond, even when rms can imitate a winners practice, the complexity due to
complementarity among di¤erent investments can make the outcome highly
contingent (For example, Kmart may try to emulate Wal-mart; Compaq
tries to learn from Dell; but these investments are not likely to achieve the
same result as the originators.). On the other hand, accumulation of orga-
nization capital can make a rm less susceptible to general market shocks.
Traditionally, companies in the same industry competed with each other on
price and quality, which makes rmsperformances highly homogeneous, and
largely dependent on general market conditions. But today, when reason-
able quality and price have become only the entry tickets to the marketplace,
unique and inimitable assets, resources, skills, and investments are becoming
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the primary sources of a rms competitive advantage.5 Firms of high OC
thus tend to be less prone to market uctuations, and the demand of their
products less a¤ected by common risk factors.
There is abundant evidence suggesting that the business sectors intan-
gible capital investments have been on the rise over the past few decades.
Companiesmarket value as a percentage of GDP has been increasing since
the 1980s, while tangible assets relative to GDP declining during the same
period. Many researchers argue that an important source for the increase in
rmsmarket capitalization is accelerated accumulation of intangible assets
(e.g., Hall, 2001). Nakumura (2001) inferred the amount of business intangi-
ble investment in US economy, using data on industrial expenditures, labor
inputs and corporate operating margins. He concluded that by 2000, pri-
vate rms invest at least $1 trillion annually in intangible assets, and 1/3 of
US corporate assets are in intangibles. Corrado, Hulten and Sichiel (2005,
2006) directly estimated and aggregated di¤erent components of business
intangible capitals. They showed that business sector intangible capital ac-
cumulation has been growing fast in the past half century, especially since
the 1980s. By the end of the 20th century, intangible capital investment
had exceeded private rmsphysical capital investment, amount to about
13% of business outputs. Atkeson & Kehoe (2005) emulated plant-life dy-
namics based on organization capital accumulation. They estimated that
the payments to intangible capital owners are on average 110% of those to
physical capital owners. Therefore, it is a reasonable conjecture that given
the large amount of intangible investment in the business sector, if such in-
vestment has any impact on rmsrisk characteristics, the impact should be
considerable.
2.2 Other Related Literature
Just like any insightful theoretical concepts, the idea of organization capital
or business intangible capital provide unique perspectives into di¤erent eco-
nomic issues. In fact, the literature related to intangible capital is rapidly
expanding. Prescott & Visscher modeled the information accumulation and
transfer process within a rm (a type of organization capital investment),
and used it to explain stylized characteristics of rm growth rates and size
distributions. Hall (2001) argued that US rmsintangible asset accumula-
tion helps explain the persistent high valuation of common stocks compared
5Researches in business strategies have emphasized the importance of various kinds of
organization capital in shaping a rms market competence. See, for example, Barney
(1986), Lippman& Pumelt (1982), Montgomery & Wernerfelt (1988).
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to companiesbook values. Atkeson & Kehoe (2005) linked the amount of
organization capital a plant accumulated with the size of plant-specic rents.
They simulated plant distribution dynamics driven by organization capital
accumulation, and showed that the result t the real data well. Jovanovic
& Rousseau (2001) hypothesized that the quality of organization capital
di¤ers across generations of rms, which explained the cohort e¤ects in
rmsstock market performance. Brynjolfsson, Hitt & Yang (2002) found
that investment in organization capital complements investment in IT tech-
nology, and the combined investment has a signicantly larger impact on
rmsoutput and market valuation than isolated investments. McGrattan
& Prescott (2007) introduced business intangible investment in a standard
growth model and demonstrated that it helped explain US productivity and
investment boom in the 1990s. Danthine & Jin (2007) modeled di¤erent
stochastic processes in intangible capital accumulation and argued that it
contributed to high volatility in equity returns.
Although the literature related to business intangible capital is fairly
diverse, this paper, to my best knowledge, is the rst to investigate the
relationship between intangible capital accumulation and changes in the
volatility characteristics of the economy. Some authors have approached the
volatility divergence puzzle from other perspectives. Comin & Mulani (2006)
constructed a quality-ladder model where aggregate and rm-level volatil-
ities are driven by generaland applied innovations respectively. They
argued that when industry leaderspositions are less stable, resources will be
shifted from general to applied technological progress, which increases rm
volatility and suppresses aggregate uctuation. An elegant model as it is,
attributing decreases in macro volatility to less frequent general technology
shocks is probably not the most convincing. Philippon (2003) contended
that intensied market competition causes rm volatility to increase, but at
the same time, it leads rms to adjust prices faster, which in turn reduces
the impact of aggregate demand shocks. The explanation didnt accommo-
date the fact that co-movements among rms decrease during the Great
Moderation, and it is in fact an important element contributing to the ag-
gregate volatility decline (Comin & Philippon, 2005). Thesmar & Thoenig
(2004) linked volatility divergence to nancial market innovations. In their
paper, nancial development, while stabilizing at the macro level, increases
rmswillingness to take on more risks by improving risk sharing among
rms. Firm-level volatility can rise due to the latter factor. While the the-
ory is intuitively appealing, a nancial-market centered explanation is not
very likely the most crucial mechanism behind the phenomenon. In sum,
the current literature on volatility divergence leaves large room for better
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theories and further empirical investigations. This paper presented a theory
from the perspective of structural change in the production process, and
made initiatory attempts to empirically test the theory.
3 Empirical Tests
3.1 Hypotheses
The volatility decomposition in section 2 demonstrates the mechanism, from
an accounting standpoint, that can generate volatility divergence at macro
and rm level. To reiterate, when the impact of rm-specic shocks in-
creases and that of general shocks decreases, rm-level volatility can rise
while aggregate volatility is declining due to reduced positive co-movements
among rms. I argued in the previous section that the accumulation of or-
ganization capital is a fundamental reason that causes the power shiftin
di¤erent risk factors.
The goal of the empirical exercises is essentially to examine how organi-
zational investment relates to the impacts of di¤erent risk factors. I broke
the task down to three hypotheses and designed regressions to test them
separately.
 Hypothesis1: rm volatility increases with the level of orga-
nizational investment.
If the conjecture is true that investment in organization capital involves
large rm-specic risk, we shall observe sfi increases with organizational
investment. In other words, more volatile rms should be associated with
higher OC investment intensities.
 Hypothesis 2: the more a rm invests in organization capital,
the less its performance is a¤ected by general risk factor.
Firms with high OC possess unique competitive advantage, and thus are
less susceptible to uctuations in general market conditions. If this is true,
OC investment should help lower smi . And we shall observe a negative
correlation between market inuence on a rm and its OC investment level.
 Hypothesis 3: organization capital investment decreases the
co-movement among rms.
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In decomposing aggregate volatility, I showed that the bulk of decline
in aggregate uctuation is caused by reduced covariance term. If organi-
zational investment does make rms more heterogeneous and thus reduces
aggregate volatility, we should observe that a rms correlation with other
rms decreases with more investment in organization capital. This test thus
complements the second hypothesis.
3.2 Data Description
To test the above conjectures, we rst need a measure of rm-level orga-
nizational investment. Estimating the amount of organization capital at
rm level is by no means a straight forward task. Historically, intangible
capital generated within an organization is not counted as assets on the bal-
ance sheet for various reasons. One of the reasons is that for any data to be
reported in the nancial statement, the information represented must be ob-
jective and reliable. But unlike physical assets, intangible asset reporting is
more likely to be faced with such problems as uncertain investment returns,
asymmetric information, lack of market price, and subjective probability cal-
culation. Therefore, most organization capital investments are traditionally
categorized as operating expenditures. The e¤ect of expensing organiza-
tional investment is fairly obvious if we compare the cost composition of
intangible-intensive companies in emerging industries with that of more tra-
ditional manufacturing companies. Table 1 compares the cost structures of
three well-known companies.
Table 1: Cost Structure of Three Companies
Sales COGS As % R & D As % SG&A As %
of Sales of Sales of Sales
Pzer (2001) 32259 5034 15.6 4847 15.0 11299 35.0
Microsoft (2002) 28365 5191 18.3 4307 15.2 6957 24.5
Boeing (2001) 58198 48778 83.8 1936 3.3 2389 4.1
For intangible-intensive rms like Pzer and Microsoft, the cost directly
related to goods/services production (cost of goods sold) is relatively small,
compared to sales, general & administrative cost (SG&A), which includes
various intangible investment items, such as costs of marketing, advertis-
ing, research & development, and software, as well as management fees and
incentive packages.
In the following regressions, I use SG&A expenditure as an approxima-
tion for rm-specic intangible investment. Similar treatment has appeared
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Figure 2: COGS and SG&A as percentage of total sales
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in various accounting studies (see, for example, Lev and Radhakrishnan,
2005), though the emphases of those researches are very di¤erent than this
paper. Imperfect as it is, SG&A expenditure is arguably the best approxi-
mate for OC investment by far, considering data availability and accuracy.
Figure 2 calculated COGS and SG&A as % of sales for publicly-traded,
nonnancial US rms. It is clear that especially since the 1980s, the share
of COGS in the total cost has gone down dramatically, while SG&A expen-
diture has been steadily increasing. The trend of SG&A is generally in line
with other estimates of business intangible investments (e.g., Corrado et al.,
2006).
The database I used is COMPUSTAT North America, which covers the
nancial statement and stock price information for publicly-traded rms
since the 1950s. The rms included in the sample are US-based nonnancial
rms that have at least 10 years of continuous sales and expenditure records,
which add up to 218,324 rm-year observations from 1950 to 2007. Table 3
lists summary statistics for the sample rms.
Table 2: Summary Statistics of Sample Firms
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Mean Std
Sales ($mn) 996.28 6230.54
SG&A ($mn) 180.35 1060.61
COGS ($mn) 674.95 4616.63
Employees (thousands) 7.33 30.30
Gross Fixed Asset 686.62 5167.58
SG&A/Sales 1.04 27.01
COGS/Sales 0.77 14.41
Fixed Assets/Sales 1.68 73.54
3.3 Regression Strategies
To test hypothesis 1, I regressed a rms sales volatility, captured by rolling
standard deviation of sales growth, on SG&A/Sales, the intensity of or-
ganization capital investment. To compare the impact of OC investment
on volatility with that of other production inputs, I also included "xed as-
sets/sales" and "employment/sales" as explanatory variables, which capture
physical capital and labor intensities of the rm. The estimation equation
is as follows:
ln
 
gi;t

= 0 + 1 ln (sgai;t=salesi;t) + 2 ln (fixed assetsi;t=salesi;t)
+3 ln (employeesi;t=salesi;t) + ei;t
where gi;t =
rPt+4
=t 4

gi;t   1=9
Pt+4
=t 4 gi;
2
=9: If hypothesis 1 is
true, we should expect the sign of 1 to be positive.
The second hypothesis states that OC investment reduces the impact of
market risks on a rms performance. The test consists of two steps. First, I
carried out rolling regressions of a rms sales growth on industry and total
sample sales growth in 9 year windows:
ln (gi; ) = 0+1 ln (gindustry; )+2 ln (gmarket; )+"i; ; t 4 <  < t+4:
The R2 of the regression indicates how much a rms sales performance
can be explained by general risk factors, and thus provides a measure of
market impact on a rms production. Next, I regressed the R2 of the
rst regression on rms organization capital, physical capital and labor
intensities:
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ln (R2i;t) = 0 + 1 ln (sgai;t=salesi;t) + 2 ln (fixed assetsi;t=salesi;t)
+3 ln (employeesi;t=salesi;t) + i;t
If hypothesis 2 holds, the coe¢ cient for ln (sgai;t=salesi;t) should be neg-
ative.
Thirdly, I tested whether the correlation between a rms sales growth
and the rest of the sample rms is negatively a¤ected by its OC investment
intensity. I ran the following regression:
ln
 
i;t

= 0 + 1 ln (sgai;t=salesi;t) + 2 ln (fixed assetsi;t=salesi;t)
+3 ln (employeesi;t=salesi;t) + i;t
Where i;t is the correlation between rm is sales growth and that of
all other rms in the sample from t-4 to t+4. The necessary condition
for hypothesis 3 to be true would be a negative coe¢ cient for the variable
ln (sgai;t=salesi;t).
3.4 Results
Table 3 lists the results of regressing rmsrolling standard deviation of sales
on the intensities of organization capital, physical capital and labor, for the
years from 1955 to 2003. The time point of standard deviation is placed in
the middle of the 9-year rolling window.6 I carried out the estimation using
di¤erent regression methods. Specically, the regression are: (1) pooled
OLS; (2) least-square regression controlling for industries;7 (3) least-square
regression controlling for years; (4) rm xed e¤ect panel regression; (5)
between-e¤ect panel regression.
Table 3: Impact of SG&A on Firm Volatility
6The result doesnt di¤er much if the time point is put at the beginning of the 9-year
window.
7The sample rms cover 61 SIC two-digit industries.
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Std of rm growth (ln (std))
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
ln (sgai;t=salesi;t) 0.15*** 0.18*** 0.11*** 0.08*** 0.28***
(0:002) (0:003) (0:003) (0:005) (0:009)
ln (fixed assetsi;t=salesi;t) 0.05*** -0.02*** 0.05*** -0.01** 0.06***
(0:002) (0:003) (0:003) (0:004) (0:007)
ln (employeesi;t=salesi;t) -0.13*** -0.10*** -0.04*** -0.03*** -0.14***
(0:003) (0:003) (0:004) (0:003) (0:008)
observations 84698 84589 84698 84698 84698
The results show that the coe¢ cients for SG&A investments are all posi-
tive and signicant across di¤erent regressions, suggesting a positive correla-
tion between organizational investment and rm volatility. In contrast, the
signs of coe¢ cients for the other two inputs are either inconsistent across
di¤erent specications (for physical capital) or negative (for labor). The
result thus conrms Hypothesis 1.
Next, I regressed rm growth rate on market and industry growth rate,
used the R2 of the regression as a measure of general shocksimpact on rm
performance, and then regress the R2on rms production inputs. Table 4
listed the results across di¤erent regression methods.
Table 4: Relationship between SG&A and general risk factors
impact
R2 of regressing rm growth on system growth ln
 
R2

(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
ln (sga=sales) -0.13*** -0.10*** -0.08*** -0.08*** -0.07***
(0:004) (0:005) (0:005) (0:01) (0:01)
ln (fixed assets=sales) 0.06*** 0.03*** 0.07*** -0.04** 0.03***
(0:004) (0:004) (0:004) (0:008) (0:008)
ln (employees=sales) 0.03*** 0.05*** -0.07*** 0.06*** 0.01
(0:004) (0:004) (0:005) (0:006) (0:009)
observations 91980 91785 91980 91980 91980
The coe¢ cients for SG&A investments are all negative and signicant.
In other words, the more a rm invests in organization capital, the less it is
susceptible to general risk factors inuence, which conrms Hypothesis 2.
The same characteristic is not present for the other two inputs.
Table 5 presented results for the third regression. Here the focus is how
SG&A may a¤ect a rms co-movement with other rms. I rst calculated
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the correlation between a rms sales growth and that for the rest of the
sample in 9 year rolling windows, then regressed this correlation on the
rms production inputs. As the result shows, the more a rm invests in
organizational assets, the less a rm is correlated with the rest of the sample,
which is in support of hypothesis 3.
Table 5: Impact of SG&A on Correlation with Other Firms
Correlation between rm growth and market growth ()
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
ln (sga=sales) -0.06*** -0.06*** -0.04*** -0.04*** -0.05***
(0:002) (0:002) (0:002) (0:003) (0:004)
ln (fixed assets=sales) 0.03*** 0.02*** 0.04*** -0.02** 0.02***
(0:001) (0:001) (0:001) (0:003) (0:003)
ln (employees=sales) 0.02*** 0.03*** -0.04*** 0.03*** 0.009***
(0:001) (0:001) (0:002) (0:002) (0:004)
observations 81369 81369 81369 81369 81369
In sum, the empirical tests generally support the hypothesis that orga-
nization capital investment increases the impact of rm-specic risks, and
decreases that of global risks. As a result of increasing organizational invest-
ment, rm-level volatility rises while co-movements among rms decline.
However, the result doesnt mean that organizational investment has the
same impact across di¤erent time periods. In fact, when I conducted the
xed e¤ect regression by decades, the results show that the impact of or-
ganizational investment on rm volatility is only signicant for more recent
decades. Table 6 presents the result of regressing rm volatility on produc-
tion input intensities by decade. The coe¢ cients for SG&A are only positive
and signicant starting from the 1980s. So how to explain this result? First,
as will be modeled in the next section, production structure in the modern
economy is constantly evolving, and intangible capital was recognized as an
important production input only recently. Before the 80s, its impact might
not have been large enough to inuence rmsrisk characteristics on a large
scale. Second, SG&A expenditure is an imperfect measure of rmsintan-
gible investment, especially in the earlier years when the amount of such
investment was relatively small. In those cases, SG&A might be too noisy
an indicator for OC investment.
Interestingly, the lack of signicance for organizational investment in
early periods corresponds to the simulation result I will present later in
the paper the general equilibrium model featuring rm-specic intangible
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investment can imitate macro and rm level volatilities fairly well for the
1980s and beyond; but the model didnt do as well in generating realistic
macro volatility for the earlier decades.
Table 6: Firm xed e¤ect regression by decade
standard deviation of rm growth (ln ())
time ln (sga=sales) ln (fixed assets=sales) ln (employees=sales)
1960-1969 0.0002 -0.0578*** 0.0896***
1970-1979 -0.0057 -0.0083 0.0673***
1980-1989 0.0772*** -0.0166* -0.0010
1990-1999 0.1083*** -0.0487*** -0.0335***
= 2000 0.0732*** -0.0832*** 0.0537***
4 A General Equilibrium Model of Organization
Capital Accumulation
4.1 Model
The economy contains a innitely-living, representative household and n
rms. The household o¤ers labor and capital to rms and receives wage
income and prots. She derives utility from consumption and leisure. The
households optimization problem is as follows:
max
fCt;[Iki;t;Ioi;t]ni=1g1t=0
E0
1X
t=0
t
"
ln (Ct) + 
(1  Lt)1 
1  
#
s:t: Ct +
nX
i=1
Iki;t +
nX
i=1
Ioi;t  wtLt +
nX
i=1
i;t
where wt is wage rate and i;t rm is prot at time t. Firms pro-
duce identical goods, using labor (L), physical capital (K) and organization
capital (O) as inputs. The production function takes a Cobb-Douglas form:
Yi;t = K
t
i;tO
t
i;t (AtLi;t)
1 t t
where At is a global productivity shock common to all rms. It evolves
according to an AR(1) process:
ln(At+1) = a ln(At) + "t+1; "t+1~N(0; 
2
"):
17
The shares of di¤erent inputs in the production function are subject to
change through time. The changes in the relative importance of inputs are
purely exogenous, not anticipated by agents.
The accumulation of physical capital is governed by the standard process:
Ki;t+1 = (1  )Ki;t + Iki;t
where  is the depreciation rate for physical capital, and Iki;t the invest-
ment in K at time t.
An important feature of the model is the dynamic process of organization
capital accumulation:
Oi;t+1 = (1  ')Oi;t +Bi;tIoi;t
Here ' and Ioi;t are depreciation rate and investment in organization
capital respectively. And Bi;t is a rm-specic productivity shock capturing
the investment e¤ectiveness in organization capital. In other words, rm is
OC stock at time t+1 depends on un-depreciated OC from time t, investment
in OC made in period t and investment specic productivity shock that is
known at the beginning of t. Bi;t is given by the AR(1) process:
ln(Bi;t+1) = b ln(Bi;t) + i;t+1; i;t+1~N(0; 
2
); i:i:d: i = 1; 2; :::n:
The intuition is, again, that when a rm invests in organization capital,
it is faced with its own path of success and failure, though at the same time,
all rms are a¤ected by general productivity shocks.
Given wage rate and its physical and organization capital stocks at time
t, a rm makes its hiring decision to maximize the single period prot:
max
Li;t
i;t = K
t
i;tO
t
i;t(AtLi;t)
1 t t   wtLi;t   Iki;t   Ioi;t
Output Yi;t can be used for consumption or investments in both physical
and organization capital, which leads to the following aggregate resource
constraint:
Ct +
nX
i=1
Iki;t +
nX
i=1
Ioi;t =
nX
i=1
Kti;tO
t
i;t(AtLi;t)
1 t t
18
4.2 Equilibrium and Solution
An equilibrium of the economy is given by a time path of labor prices
fwtg1t=0, and decision rules fCt; (Li;t)ni=1 ;

Iki;t
n
i=1
;

Ioi;t
n
i=1
g1t=0, such that
given the wages, the households consumption and investment choices maxi-
mize her life time utility; rmshiring decisions maximize their prots; labor
and goods markets clear.
Since the market is essentially complete in the economy, the competi-
tive equilibrium allocation is identical to the solution of the following social
planners problem:
max
fCt;[Iki;t;Ioi;t]ni=1;[Li;t]ni=1g1t=0
E0
1X
t=0
t
"
ln (Ct) + 
(1  Lt)1 
1  
#
s:t: Ct +
nX
i=1
Iki;t +
nX
i=1
Ioi;t =
nX
i=1
Kti;tO
t
i;t(AtLi;t)
1 t t
Ki;t+1 = (1  )Ki;t + Iki;t
Oi;t+1 = (1  ')Oi;t +Bi;tIoi;t
ln(At+1) = a ln(At) + "t+1; "t+1~N(0; 
2
")
ln(Bi;t+1) = b ln(Bi;t) + i;t+1; i;t+1~N(0; 
2
)
nX
i=1
Li;t = Lt
To solve the model, I derived the rst order conditions from the social
planners problem, log-linearized the rst order conditions around the steady
states, and numerically computed the policy functions.
The Lagrangian of social planners problem is:
L = max
fCt;[Ki;t+1;Oi;t+1]ni=1;[Li;t]ni=1g1t=0
E0f
1X
t=0
t[ln (Ct) + 
(1  Lt)1 
1  
+t[
nX
i=1
Kti;tO
t
i;t(AtLi;t)
1 t t +
nX
i=1
(1  )Ki;t +
nX
i=1
(1  ')Oi;t
 Ct  
nX
i=1
Ki;t+1  
nX
i=1
Oi;t+1
Bi;t
] + &t(Lt  
nX
i=1
Li;t)]g
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The appendix explains in more details the procedure used to solve the
model.
5 Calibration
5.1 Strategy
To see how well the model can replicate the volatility divergence in data,
I calibrated the model economy, assuming that the relative importance of
di¤erent inputs in the production process has undergone signicant changes
in the past 50 years.
Recall that the production function in the model takes the form Yi;t =
Kti;tO
t
i;t(AtLi;t)
1 t t . Structural shifts in the relative importance of pro-
duction inputs can be represented by changing coe¢ cients for K, O and L in
the production function. Such changes in factorsshares result in di¤erent
steady state variable values and ratios, which, with reasonable parameter
choices, should approximate the data trend in US economy.
The steady state equations for the model economy are as follows:
(1 
nX
j=1
Lj)
  =
1
C
(1    )AKi Oi L  i
1

= AK 1i O

i L
1  
i + (1  )
1

= AKi O
 1
i L
1  
i + (1  '); i = 1; 2; :::n
C + 
nX
j=1
Kj + '
nX
j=1
Oj =
nX
j=1
AKj O

jL
1  
j
whereKi; Oi; Li; C are steady state values forKi;t; Oi;t; Li;t; Ct, and A=1.
The 3n+1 equations determine the 3n+1 steady state variables fK1; :::Kn;
O1; :::On; L1; :::Ln; Cg, with 8 exogenously given parameters f; ; '; ; ; ; ; ng.
I use the standard quarterly discount factor 0.99, which implies an annual
discount rate =0.96. The annual depreciation rate for physical capital is
set at 0.048, as in Cooley & Prescott (1995). There is very few information
available about the depreciation rate of organization capital. Here I assume
an annual depreciation rate of 0.5, which is a mix of the depreciation rates
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for di¤erent classes of business intangibles appeared in the literature.8 I set
 equal 4, and calculated the value of  to keep the fraction of total hours
worked equal to 0.31. For the autocorrelation coe¢ cients of the two shocks,
I assume they are both equal to 0.9. I adopt the standard assumption for the
volatility of aggregate technology shocks the standard deviation of global
shocks is set at 0.007. No estimation is available for the standard deviation
of idiosyncratic shocks that hit individual rms. In the baseline calibration,
I assume it is equal to that of the general shocks.
For physical capitals share in the production function, I assume the
usual value =0.4. To obtain the share of organization capital, notice that
from the steady state equations, we can write the relative share of the two
capitals as


=
1=   (1  )K
1=   (1  ')O:
The ratio of the two capital stocks in the steady state is KO =
'

Ik
Io .
Substitute it into the above equation, and we obtain the share of organization
capital in the production function:
 =
1=   (1  ') 
1=   (1  )'

Ik
Io

:
Corrado et al. (2006) provided time-series estimates for the amount of
business intangible investments in the economy by decade. Using their esti-
mation, combined with the total amount of private physical investment from
BEA, we can get the decade-average organization capital/physical capital
investment ratios (Table 7). I take the ratios as mid-decade steady-state
Io=Iks, which can then be used to obtain a time series of . To make the
jumps between steady states relatively smooth, I assumed that the shares in
production function therefore steady state variable values change every
half decade, and interpolated a series of steady state Io=Ik ratios from the
numbers given in Table 7. Parameter  is adapted accordingly to preserve
the steady state labor supply characteristics. Table 8 listed the steady-state
Io=Ik and the calibrated s. Table 9 listed other major parameter values
discussed above, which are kept xed throughout the calibration.
Table 7: Business Sector Investments and Ratios
8For example, Corrado et al (2006) advocates the following depreciation schedules:
33% for computerized information, 20% for R&D, 60% for brand equity, 40% for rms
structural resources.
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($bn, annual average)9
1950-1959 1960-1969 1970-1979 1980-1989 1990-1999 2000-2003
Business Tangible 19.4 41.9 103.4 349.3 749.8 1,226.20
Investment,Ik
Business Intangible 35.6 67.3 171.4 421.1 676.5 893.4
Investment,Io
Ratio:Io=Ik 0.55 0.62 0.60 0.83 1.11 1.37
Table 8: Calibrated values of gamma
Time Io=Ik  
1955-1959 0.545 0.126 0.518
1960-1964 0.584 0.135 0.514
1965-1969 0.623 0.145 0.510
1970-1974 0.613 0.142 0.511
1975-1979 0.603 0.140 0.512
1980-1984 0.716 0.166 0.502
1985-1989 0.829 0.192 0.490
1990-1994 0.969 0.225 0.474
1995-1999 1.108 0.257 0.457
2000-2004 1.24 0.288 0.439
 2005 1.373 0.318 0.419
Table 9: Baseline Parameter Values
  '   "  a b n
0.96 0.048 0.5 4 0.4 0.007 0.007 0.9 0.9 50
5.2 Calibration Results
I simulated the model 100 times, each simulation being sixty years from
1950-2010. I then logarithmed and rst di¤erenced the simulated output
series, and calculated 9-year rolling standard deviations for both aggregate
and rm-level output growths. Table 10 presents the average rolling stan-
dard deviations by decade, using the baseline parameters listed above. For
comparison, the corresponding values in empirical data are also listed. To
give a more straightforward representation of the models volatility trends,
Figure 3 plots the simulated time series for both macro and micro level
rolling standard deviations by year.
Table 10: Simulation result: average rolling standard deviation
of outputs
9Source: Corrado et al. (2006) and BEA.
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Average aggregate Average rm-level
volatility (%std) volatility (%std)
Time Model Data Model Data
1955-1959 1.2729 2.4550 7.1262 14.1237
1960-1969 1.3473 1.6802 8.6236 14.2859
1970-1979 1.2937 1.5563 9.0610 17.7532
1980-1989 1.8821 1.7858 11.5345 24.0382
1990-1999 1.6425 0.8828 17.8298 26.1928
2000-2003 1.2316 1.1129 25.1664 27.2878
Figure 3: Simulated aggregate and rm-level volatilities
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How well does the model economy replicate the stylized facts in data?
The rst thing to notice in Figure 3 is that the model does produce a di-
vergence in aggregate and rm-level volatility for the past two decades or
so. At the macro level, the model generates decreasing aggregate volatility
since the early 1980s, which period was recognized by many researchers as
the beginning of signicant decline in macroeconomic uctuations. For the
period from 1990 to 1999, the volatility decrease in the model economy is
not as sharp as in data, but in general, the model imitates the drop in macro
volatility reasonably well. At the rm level, the model is able to generate a
trend of consistently increasing volatility, though the magnitude is smaller
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than in empirical data. The level of rm volatility that the model can pro-
duce has a lot to do with the choice of standard deviation for idiosyncratic
shocks, which we basically have no reliable information on. I will discuss
this relationship in the sensitivity analysis section later.
For the period before 1980s, the simulation did not do very well. The
model produces much lower macro volatilities for the 50s and 60s than is
seen in data. At the rm level, the simulated volatility is also lower than
data, though the model does produce a mildly rising volatility trend for this
period, which is consistent with the data.
To sum up, the model successfully captures the divergence in macro and
rm-level volatility since the 1980s, in both qualitative and quantitative
sense. But the model is not able to generate high macro volatility for earlier
periods.
Turning to business cycle properties of other key variables, Table 10 re-
ports the average standard deviation, correlation with output and 1st order
auto-corelation coe¢ cient for consumption, aggregate investments and hours
worked. For consumption and hours, the results are broadly in line with styl-
ized business cycle facts, except that the autocorrelation coe¢ cients for both
variables are higher than in real data. The part that deviates most from
reality is the volatility of investment. The model produces large swings for
investments in both K and O. Especially, the volatility of Ik is much higher
than in the data. In addition, Ik and Io are negatively correlated with out-
put, which is obviously counterfactual. There are two reasons why the model
doesnt generate realistic investment volatility at the aggregate level. First,
in the calibration, I changed  multiple times and also the corresponding
steady states. The jumpsbetween steady states are mostly accomplished
by relatively abrupt changes in investments. In periods of transition be-
tween steady states, the output level would temporarily decrease because
of unexpected change in the production function, while at the same time,
investment is going up because of higher intangible capitalsshare. This fea-
ture of the model largely contributes to the negative correlations between
output and investments, and the large swings in investment. In fact, when
I carried out the same simulation, but without any increase in , the cor-
relation between Y and Ik increases to 0.41 and that between Y and Io to
0.82, while standard deviations of investments decrease signicantly. Sec-
ond, unlike the standard business cycle model where there are only aggregate
productivity shocks, the model generates n+1 i.i.d. shocks every period, n
of which are investment specic shocks to individual rms. This induces
larger volatility at the rm level, and increases aggregate investment volatil-
ity as well. Both volatilities decrease with the choice of n. For example,
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when I ran the simulation with n=2, the standard deviations of Ik and Io
decreased to 12.5 and 13.46 respectively, while correlations between Y and
investments increased remarkably; but at the same time, the divergence be-
tween rm-level and aggregate output volatilities disappeared. In section 7,
I will present an alternative version of the model with additional restrictions
on investments, which makes aggregate investment less volatile, yet at the
cost of reduced rm-level volatilities.
Table 11: Business cycle properties of the simulated economy
Variables %std (std across Correlation 1st order
simulations) with output autocorrelation
Output 1.72 (0.086) 1.00 0.95
Consumption 1.36 (0.023) 0.52 0.86
Ik 321.54 (59.603) -0.25 0.59
Io 15.58 (0.547) -0.45 0.95
Hours 1.40 (0.078) 0.90 0.96
6 Sensitivity Analysis
In the baseline calibration, the share of organization capital in the produc-
tion function is inferred from parameter values and empirical estimations
of Ik=Io investment ratios. Therefore, the values of , steady states and
policy functions are highly dependent upon assumptions about relevant pa-
rameters. In this section, I adopted alternative assumptions for physical
capitals share , organization capitals depreciation rate ', standard devi-
ation of idiosyncratic shocks ;and simulated the model for the respective
scenarios.
Table 12: Sensitivity analysis alternative values of 
Aggregate Volatility Firm-level Volatility
 = 0:2  = 0:3  = 0:45  = 0:2  = 0:3  = 0:45
1955-1959 1.2492 1.3462 0.6622 5.3576 4.3895 9.2729
1960-1969 1.5482 1.0771 0.7171 6.0324 4.9731 10.8682
1970-1979 1.7968 1.2575 1.1698 6.5189 5.2664 11.8300
1980-1989 3.4898 2.4938 1.7972 8.4908 6.7111 15.3040
1990-1999 3.3714 2.4516 1.7557 11.8223 9.5216 25.5043
2000-2003 2.6557 1.7738 1.7319 14.7713 11.9644 36.7032
Table 12 reports the average rolling standard deviations by decade at
both macro and rm level for alternative choices of  (the steady states
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and time series of  are adjusted accordingly). The starting value 0.2 is
from Atkeson & Kehoe (2005)s estimation of physical capitals share in the
output of US manufacturing sector. The result shows that no matter what
the choice of  is, the model generates decreasing macro volatility since the
1980s and consistently rising rm-level volatility.
Table 13: Sensitivity analysis alternative values of '
Aggregate Volatility Firm-level Volatility
' = 0:25 ' = 0:45 ' = 0:65 ' = 0:25 ' = 0:45 ' = 0:65
1955-1959 1.0615 1.1741 1.1167 8.6189 7.3765 6.8377
1960-1969 0.6945 1.2292 1.0010 10.5576 8.7617 7.8534
1970-1979 1.2277 1.3117 1.1490 11.3991 9.3464 8.3238
1980-1989 1.3810 1.7435 2.3050 14.6057 12.0093 10.9464
1990-1999 1.4611 1.5259 1.7846 22.6387 18.2716 16.6941
2000-2003 2.6658 1.2015 1.1644 31.5412 25.9397 22.1945
Table 13 presents the volatility statistics across di¤erent assumptions for
the depreciation rate of organization capital. At the rm level, regardless
of Os depreciation rate, rm volatilities all increase through time. But at
the macro level, the result is fairly sensitive to the choice of '. Higher
depreciation rates generate a more salient pattern of volatility decline in the
past two decades, while a small ' (0.25) fails to produce any decrease in
macro volatility.
Table 14: Sensitivity analysis alternative values of 
Aggregate Volatility Firm-level Volatility
= 0:006 = 0:008 = 0:009 = 0:006 = 0:008 = 0:009
1955-1959 1.2535 1.2241 1.0903 6.2247 8.0162 9.0585
1960-1969 1.3798 1.4909 1.2911 7.5398 9.8231 11.2579
1970-1979 1.2399 1.4224 1.5003 7.9424 10.4785 11.9206
1980-1989 2.0367 1.8185 1.8987 10.0408 13.2423 14.6813
1990-1999 1.8128 1.5576 1.2919 15.9221 19.5503 22.6511
2000-2003 1.5543 1.2940 1.9666 21.1994 28.0999 31.8900
Finally, Table 14 lists the volatility results with changes in the standard
deviation of idiosyncratic shocks. Quite intuitively, a smaller  produces
less volatile rms rm-level standard deviations increase with . But
at the macro level, the e¤ect of change in  is less obvious, especially for
earlier years, when  is small and the aggregate impact of organization-
specic shocks very limited.
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Overall, the sensitivity analyses indicate that the volatility divergence
generated by changes in organization capitals share in the production func-
tion is fairly robust to alternative parameter choices. A fall in macro volatil-
ity since the 1980s and continuously rising rm volatility are present across
most of the alternative scenarios. But quantitatively, how well the model
actually matches data is sensitive to some parameter choices.
7 Model with Capital Adjustment Cost
As shown in section 5, a shortcoming of the model is that the business cycle
properties of aggregate investments are not very realistic. In this section, I
introduce adjustment costs in the capital accumulation process to improve
the model characteristics of aggregate investments.
The basic setup is the same as in section 4, except the capital accumu-
lation rule, which is changed to the following:
Ki;t+1   pk ln (Ki;t+1   (1  )Ki;t) = (1  k)Ki;t + Iki;t
Oi;t+1   po ln (Oi;t+1   (1  ')Oi;t) = (1  o)Oi;t +Bi;tIoi;t
where pk and po are two small positive numbers.
Since the adjustment cost function px ln (Xi;t+1   (1  )Xi;t) converges
to  1 when [Xi;t+1  (1  )Xi;t]!+ 0, the term creates a large cost when
the new investments in K and O for any rm approach zero, and thus assures
that in the solution to the optimization problem, every rm receives positive
investments of both capitals in any given period. On the other hand, when a
rms optimal investments are well above zero, the existence of adjustment
cost terms will not signicantly change the result compared to the original
model, as long as pk and po are kept very small.
The Lagrangian for the social planners problem now takes the following
form
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It is clear that if px=0, we go back to the original solution. In the follow-
ing simulation exercise, I set pk = po = 0:000002. Other parameters are the
same as in section 5. Table 15 presents the cyclical behaviors of the model
economy after adding adjustment cost. Compared with the baseline model,
one improvement is that, though still higher than empirical observation, the
volatility of aggregate investment in K is much lower than in the original
model. Besides, the correlation between Ik and Y is now positive, though
lower than the data.
Table 15: Business cycle properties of model economy with
adjustment cost
Variables %std (std across Correlation 1st order
simulations) with output autocorrelation
Output 1.64 (0.040) 1.00 0.95
Consumption 1.33 (0.021) 0.49 0.91
Ik 52.82 (20.194) 0.28 0.96
Io 13.28 (0.289) -0.46 0.87
Hours 1.32 (0.032) 0.89 0.96
The improvements in investment characteristics are not without cost.
Table 16 and gure 4 report the output volatility trends of the model with
adjustment costs. Although the aggregate volatility is at the same range
as before, the rm level volatility turns out to be much lower, due to the
fact that the additional restriction on rms investment curbed the degree of
variations among rms. But qualitatively, the model is still able to generate
the divergence in macro and rm-level volatility from the 1980s onward.
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Figure 4: Volatility trends of model economy with adjustment costs
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Table 16: Average rolling standard deviations of outputs
Average aggregate Average rm-level
volatility (%std) volatility (%std)
Time Model Data Model Data
1955-1959 1.3541 2.4550 4.0141 14.1237
1960-1969 1.2829 1.6802 4.7188 14.2859
1970-1979 1.1977 1.5563 5.0884 17.7532
1980-1989 1.7510 1.7858 6.2470 24.0382
1990-1999 1.6664 0.8828 9.1524 26.1928
2000-2003 1.0871 1.1129 12.0947 27.2878
8 Conclusion
The aggregate output volatility of US economy has declined signicantly
since the early 1980s, but at the same time, rm performance has become
more volatile. The latter fact contradicts many explanations of the Great
Moderation that imply a direct transfer between macro and rm-level
volatilities. This paper provides a theory to reconcile the two phenomena
from the perspective of structural change in production activities.
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I argued that organization capital investment is a key factor causing the
volatility divergence. During roughly the same period as the great moder-
ation, business sectors organization capital, or rm-specic intangible cap-
ital, has been increasing rapidly. Such organizational investment is an
important source of idiosyncratic risks, while at the same time it makes a
rm less susceptible to general market risks. When rms in the economy
invest more in organization capital, the impact of rm-specic risk factor
becomes larger and that of general risk factor smaller. The former causes
rm-level volatility to increase; the latter, through lowering the positive
comovements among rms, reduces aggregate volatility. In this sense, the
decline in macro volatility during the past two decades should rather be
called the Great Dissolution.
Using rmsSG&A expenditure as an approximation for organization
capital investment, I looked at how a rms sales volatility, the impact of
general risks, and a rms performance correlation with other rms are af-
fected by its organization capital intensity, compared to the inuence of
other production inputs. The results show that rmsvolatility increases
with more investment in organization capital. Meanwhile, organizational
investment decreases general shocksimpact and a rms comovement with
others. The result generally supports my hypotheses about the relationship
between organizational investment and rmsrisk characteristics.
I constructed a general equilibrium model featuring organization capital
investment. In the model, a rm is subject to two shocks, a global tech-
nology shock that a¤ects all rms alike, and an idiosyncratic productivity
shock that is specic to a rms organization capital accumulation process.
With reasonable parameter choices, the model is able to generate volatility
divergence during the past two decades and quantitatively match the sales
volatility data at both macro and rm level. The simulation result before
the 1980s was much less satisfactory, suggesting that organization capital
playing a signicant role in the production process is a relatively recent
phenomenon.
To sum up, the paper shows that organization capital investment pro-
vides a constructive perspective in solving the diverging volatility puzzle.
The empirical evidence presented in the paper is still preliminary. To ex-
tend the current investigation, further empirical analysis at di¤erent levels
of aggregation, e.g., at sector and industry level, can be very helpful.
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A Solution Method
In this section, I explain the solution method of the model.
The rst order conditions of the planners problem are10:
1
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The steady state equations are:
10By taking rst order conditions, an interior solution is already assumed. Why can we
rule out corner solution? In other words, is it possible that in some periods, certain rms
get zero investment because they are hit by low shocks? The answer is no. The reason is
as follows. Assume all rms start with the same amount of capitals K and O, but rm A
has higher organizational investment-specic shock for the next period. Suppose the social
planner chooses to concentrate all the new O investment in rm A and starve other rms,
obviously all the new K investment has to be made in rm A, too, otherwise too much O
makes the marginal productivity of O in rm A go down so much that it can hardly be
optimal. Now think of what happens to other rms. They get zero new investment, but
are still in business with the left-over K and O from last period. But K and O have very
di¤erent depreciation rates. Specically, in the model, I assume depreciation for K around
5% per year, but for O about 50%. So in the next period, the marginal productivity of
O in other rms would be much higher than in rm A, if they dont receive any new O
investment. The situation can be improved if social planner had chosen to invest some
O in these low-shock rms, which means that the investment schedule I assumed in the
beginning cannot be optimal. The key thing here is a much higher depreciation rate for
O than for K. And this assumption is by no means unrealistic.
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And let lower case letters denote log-deviations of variables from the
steady state. Log-linearizing the rst order conditions and constraints around
the steady state:
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Exogenous shock processes take the form:
at+1 = aat + "t+1; "t+1~iid N(0; 
2
")
bi;t+1 = bbi;t + i;t+1; i = 1; 2; :::n; i;t+1~iid N(0; 
2
)
I then solved for the equilibrium law of motion using Schur factorization
method proposed by King & Watson (2002).
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